
goeasy
Canada's largest non-prime consumer lender, whose shares fell roughly 70% after a large Q4 2025 credit charge pushed it into a trailing-twelve-month loss.
The business
goeasy lends to non-prime and near-prime Canadian consumers through three channels: easyfinancial (unsecured and secured personal loans), easyhome (lease-to-own merchandise), and LendCare (point-of-sale financing across auto, powersports, retail and healthcare).
It historically ran a consumer-loan book of roughly C$4–5 billion and was one of the TSX's longest-running dividend growers before a sharp 2025-2026 credit deterioration.
Revenue is still growing (~C$413M in Q1 2026, up ~2% YoY), but earnings have collapsed under elevated loan-loss provisions.
The moat
Scale leadership in an underserved non-prime niche that the big banks largely avoid, with proprietary credit-scoring models built on 20+ years of loan-performance data.
Omnichannel distribution (branches, online, and thousands of merchant partners via LendCare) and diversified funding.
That moat is currently being tested: the 2025-2026 credit event shows the model's cyclicality and sensitivity to consumer stress.
Related on CoinCompass: Diversified financials · FCF yield ranking. For the underlying numbers, see stockanalysis.com — goeasy financials.
Financial snapshot
Most recent reported period : Q1 FY2026 (ended Mar 31, 2026). Figures reflect the review date — confirm current numbers before acting.
| Q1 2026 revenue | ~C$412.9M (+2% YoY) |
| Q1 2026 net income | -C$53.0M net loss (vs +C$38.7M in Q1 2025) |
| Q1 2026 diluted EPS | -C$3.22 (vs +C$2.28) |
| Q4 2025 result | Net loss C$337.4M (EPS -C$20.49), reflecting a large reported credit charge |
| TTM net income | ~ -C$270M (trailing-twelve-month loss) |
| Market cap | ~C$0.78B (share price ~C$48.73) |
| Share price | Down roughly 70% from 2025 levels |
Free cash flow yield & sustainable growth
Earnings yield : ≈-33.4%Trailing-twelve-month diluted EPS of roughly -C$16.30 on a ~C$48.73 share price gives a negative earnings yield (~-33%); TTM net loss ~C$270M following a ~C$337M Q4 2025 charge. P/E is not meaningful.
For a balance-sheet lender, sustainable growth is governed by loan-book growth, net charge-off rates, and access to funding — all of which deteriorated sharply into 2026.
Historical earnings-per-share compounding (mid-teens for years) has reversed; a return to growth requires provisioning to normalize.
Valuation & what to watch
With a trailing net loss, the P/E is not meaningful and the trailing earnings yield is deeply negative (~ -33%).
The stock now trades far below prior levels; any bull case depends on whether the credit book stabilizes and earnings recover toward historical run-rates. Verify all figures against goeasy's actual filings before relying on them.
Dividend
goeasy raised its dividend for more than a decade (C$5.84 annualized in 2025). Following the Q4 2025 loss, market-data sources show a yield in roughly the 6–9% range on the depressed price, but the reported per-share figure varies by source and the payout's sustainability is now in question — treat any specific yield as unverified.
Risks & the bear case
- A severe, reported credit event (large Q4 2025 charge and Q1 2026 loss) that may not be fully worked through.
- Non-prime borrowers are highly sensitive to unemployment and rate stress; further consumer deterioration would compound losses.
- Funding-cost and covenant risk if losses continue, and possible pressure on the dividend.
Recent developments
Q4 2025 produced a net loss of ~C$337M (EPS -C$20.49), with market commentary citing elevated net charge-offs and weakness in merchant-originated lending.
Q1 2026 (reported ~May 2026) showed a smaller net loss of ~C$53M on revenue of ~C$413M — revenue still growing but earnings negative.
Shares trade near C$48.73 with a market cap around C$0.78B, down sharply from 2025.
Verdict
goeasy has gone from a decade-long compounding story to a distressed one almost overnight: a large reported credit charge in Q4 2025 wiped out a year of profits and cut the share price by roughly 70%. The revenue franchise is intact and the non-prime niche remains real, but the central question is whether the credit deterioration is a one-off cleanup or a structural problem in the loan book — and that cannot be answered from market data alone. This is a high-uncertainty situation where the reported numbers demand extra scrutiny. CoinCompass is a publisher, not an adviser; read goeasy's primary filings and press releases before drawing conclusions.
Sources
CoinCompass is a publisher, not a registered investment adviser. This is factual information and opinion for a general audience — not a recommendation to buy or sell any security, and not individualized advice. Figures are the most recent reported at the review date and will change. The author, John Wilson, has disclosed long-term holdings in Canadian equities (including Boyd Group, Constellation Software and MTY Food Group) and may hold positions in securities discussed. Do your own research or consult a licensed professional. See our disclosures. John Wilson → · disclosures →